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Abstract
Riesz representation theorem, Daniell-Stone theorem for Daniell integrals and Stone’s representation theo-
rem for probability and measure algebras are three important classical results in analysis concerning existence
of measures with certain properties. Many proofs of these theorems can be found in the literature of analysis,
from elementary ones which use ordinary techniques from measure theory, to more sophisticated ones, such as
those employing techniques from nonstandard analysis, in particular for Riesz representation theorem. In this
paper, as the first goal, we give new proofs for all these three theorems. Our proofs have a mild logical flavor
and are uniform in the sense that they are all based on the same general idea and rely on the application of the
same technical tool from logic to measure theory, namely logical compactness theorem. In fact, as the second
goal of the paper, we try to reveal more the power of logical methods in analysis in particular measure theory,
and make stronger connections between analysis and logic. We use the setting of ”integration logic” which is a
logical framework (and one of the forms of probability logics) for studying measure and probability structures
by logical means. Indeed, we elaborate this setting and use its expressive power and a version of compactness
theorem holding in it to show its application in measure theory by giving new proofs for the above-mentioned
measure existence theorems. As mentioned, an advantage of these proofs is that they are all given in a uniform
way since they are all based on the logical compactness theorem. The paper is mostly written for general math-
ematicians, in particular the people active in analysis or logic as the main audience. So it is self-contained and
the reader does not need to have any advanced prerequisite knowledge from logic or measure theory.
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1. Introduction
There are several results in analysis concerning existence of measures with certain properties. Riesz repre-
sentation theorem, Daniell-Stone theorem for Daniell integrals and Stone’s representation theorem for probabil-
ity algebras are some remarkable examples of such measure existence results. Many proofs for these classical
theorems, in particular for Riesz representation theorem, have been discovered by different methods so far. It
is worth mentioning that among various proofs of Riesz representation theorem, many of them, such as the
ones in the papers [6], [7], [10], [17] and [20] are using ideas from outside of classical analysis for example
from nonstandard analysis. On the other hand, there are many instances that tools from mathematical logic are
used for studying objects or theories from analysis, probability theory, dynamical systems, etc. For example
in papers such as [3], operator algebras have been studied by logical (model theoretic) means. Also in [2],
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an extensive logical investigation of stochastic processes has been carried out. Furthermore, in [8] logic gets
involved with dynamical systems for giving a proof of the Furstenberg correspondence between finite sets and
dynamical systems. During the course of our investigation in this paper we mainly pursue two goals. One
of them is to give some relatively simple, uniform new proofs with a mild logical flavor for all three above-
mentioned classical theorems. The second goal of the paper is to highlight and elaborate the application of
logical tools in the realms of analysis in particular measure theory and make stronger connections between
analysis and logic. In fact, these proofs, beside the fact that are new proofs for some classical theorems which
might be of interest of its own right, are indicating the power of logical methods in measure theory. Our proofs
can be considered as some applications of a particular logical setting, namely ”integration logic” (or integral
logic), originally introduced in the works of Keisler and Hoover as a setup for dealing with probability and
measure spaces by logical means. Although the methods of the proofs in this paper involves tools from logic,
the reader is not required to be a logician or have any significant amount of knowledge from logic to follow
the proofs or even apply their ideas for possibly proving similar result. In fact, regarding the logical techniques
used in the proofs, one only needs to be able to formalize the problem in a certain logical framework by using a
very mild language which we explain later. Then, the rest of the logical part of the proof will be automatically
handled by a logical machinery in behind, namely the compactness theorem. The paper is self-contained and
all prerequisites from logic and measure theory are explained in it.
We proceed by explaining more technically about various logical approaches to structures from mathemat-
ics in particular analysis. A usual trend in mathematical logic is to study mathematical objects by logical means.
For example, algebraic structures are usually studied using a classical logical setting called first order logic. To
study structures outside algebra such as measure theory, one usually considers other sorts of logics. In fact,
there are several ways for incorporating measure and probability in logic. Probability logics, such as the ones
introduced in [8], [11], [12], [13], [16] and [19], are among various logical frameworks designed to deal with
probability and measure structures. Probability logics have wide range of connections to many other topics
such as model theory (see [12], [13]), combinatorics and dynamical systems (see [8]), PAC-learning (see [19]),
etc. In [12], an interesting form of probability logics, called integration logic, is investigated which enables one
to use integral operation as a logical quantifier. In [1], a detailed presentation of integration logic is given. It is
worth mentioning that in [15], integration logic is represented as a specific example of a more abstract frame-
work developed with a viewpoint close to functional analysis. As mentioned earlier, as one of the targets of
this paper, we use the framework of integration logic and find concrete applications of it by giving new logical
proofs for the three above-mentioned classical theorems. Using suitable logical frameworks might sometimes
enable one to provide uniform proofs with similar techniques for seemingly different theorems. It it indeed the
case in this paper. An advantage of the logical methods of prove we employ in this work is that the results
are obtained as the consequences (of course not directly, but after putting some additional efforts) of a single
fundamental fact, namely logical compactness theorem, and that, due to this, the proofs are uniform. There are
many facts in analysis that can be considered in the way that we present in this paper. But, we are selective
and just try to reveal the power of some logical methods in this field. In fact, methods and strategies of the
proofs here (which rely on using of logical compactness theorem) seem to be more general than our results
and are possibly applicable (to some degree) in various measure existence results. Although the compactness
theorem is stated in the logic framework, it is easily used in practice. Compactness theorem in a logical setting
roughly states that if we have a family of properties formally stated in that setting and every finite subset of
them is satisfied in some structure, then there is a structure that satisfies all of them together. In fact, there
are many interesting real analytic notions or claims that can be decomposed to an infinite number of simple
finitary statements. Then, by compactness theorem, the truth of the intended claim is reduced to satisfiability of
every finite number of these statements. Compactness theorem is essentially an existence theorem. Hence, its
applications are so too. In the chapters, we will explain by detail how to use it to prove the mentioned classical
existence theorems.
The paper is mostly written for general mathematicians, in particular the people active in analysis or logic
as the main audience. For those readers who are not familiar with logic, we give a general picture of how logic
and compactness theorem play role and also roughly explain the steps of the proofs. The method used is similar
to the easy and well-known applications of the classical logical compactness theorem in algebra. For example,
in order to show (by a known and old application of the compactness theorem of a classical logical framework
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called first order logic) that an order relation on a partially ordered set A can be extended to a total order, we
first extend the atomic diagram of A (which is, roughly speaking, the set of all first order properties holding
in A) with the linearity axiom and denote it by T . Then, we prove that T is finitely satisfiability (i.e. every
finite subset of it is satisfiable in some structure). Then, we apply compactness theorem to obtain a structure B
satisfying all expressions in T together. But since B satisfies properties mentioned in T , it is a linearly ordered
extension of A. So, in the final step, we push the resulting order from B to A. In this paper, this procedure is
adopted for dealing with measure structures. But, the arguments are a bit more complicated and require some
elementary analytic details. More precisely, in the first step, we express (by logical expressions in integration
logic) some properties of a measure structure we need to obtain. These expressions are very close to ordinary
ways in mathematics to express properties of measure spaces and form a possibly infinite family of expressions
which we call that a theory T . Then in the second step, we prove the finitely satisfiability of T , which means that
for every finite subset T ′ of T we find a model of T ′, which is loosely speaking, a measure structure satisfying
every expression in T ′. In the third step, we use the logical compactness theorem (which is the main use of
logic in this paper) holding in integration logic to conclude from finitely satisfiability that T has a model, which
roughly means that there exists a measure structure that satisfies all expressions in T . The above three steps
would be enough for the proof of Stone’s representation theorem for probability algebras. But in the proof of
Daniell-Stone theorem and Riesz representation theorem, we will need also a forth step to induce the measure
obtained in the third step on the initial space we started with. This leads us to find a suitable measure on the
initial structure as was desired. Having this explanation in mind, the reader who is solely interested in measure
theoretic aspects can skip the logical part of the paper and directly goes to the proofs.
Presentation of the paper is as follows. In Subsection 2.1, we briefly review basic measure theoretic con-
cepts and give a concise introduction to the integration logic. Then, In Subsection 2.2, we state some prelimi-
nary lemmas we will need later in proofs of the main results. In Section 3, which is the main part of the paper,
we give several instances of real analytic notions expressible in integration logic and combine them with the
power of the logical compactness theorem to give new proofs for the mentioned classical measure existence
theorems.
2. Preliminaries
2.1. Preliminaries from measure theory and logic
We review some preliminaries from measure theory. A (Boolean algebra) measure on a Boolean algebra
B of subsets of M is a finitely additive real-valued function µ : B → [0,∞] such that µ(∅) = 0 and for any
countable sequence Ak ∈ B of disjoint sets for which ∪kAk ∈ B, one has µ(
⋃
k Ak) =
∑
k µ(Ak). If B is a
σ-algebra, µ is called a measure. Now we recall the definition of subspace measures. For any measure space
(M,B, µ), the outer measure µ∗ on M is defined by µ∗(X) = inf{µ(A)| X ⊆ A ∈ B} for every X ⊆ M. If N ⊆ M,
then BN = {A ∩ N| A ∈ B} forms a σ-algebra of subsets of N and the restriction of µ
∗ to it, denoted by µN , is a
measure. Indeed, elements of BN are µ
∗|N-measurable. µN is called the subspace measure on N. If f : M → R
is measurable, by
∫
N
f |N is meant
∫
N
( f |N)dµN where f |N is the notation for restriction of f to N.
Proposition 2.1. (see [5], Subsection 214) Let (M,B, µ) be a measure space, N ⊆ M and f an integrable
function on M. Then the followings hold.
(a) f |N is µN-integrable, and
∫
N
f 6
∫
f if f is nonnegative.
(b) If either N is of full outer measure in M or f is zero almost everywhere on M − N, then
∫
N
f |N =
∫
M
f .
The following theorem is a very useful method for constructing the measures by extension.
Theorem 2.2. (Carathe´odory extension theorem) Let µ be a finite measure on a Boolean algebra B of subsets
of M. Then µ has an extension µ¯ to σ(B) (the σ-algebra generated by B). Moreover the extension constructed
in this way is unique.
Carathe´odory’s construction is usually divided into two parts. First, one extends any measure µ on (M,B)
to an outer measure by defining µ∗(E) = inf
{ ∑
k µ(Ak) : E ⊆
⋃
k<ω Ak, Ak ∈ B
}
for each E ⊆ M. Then,
one defines a complete measure on M by restricting µ∗ to µ∗-measurable sets, i.e. sets A ⊆ M for which
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µ∗(E) = µ∗(E ∩ A) + µ∗(E − A) for every E ⊆ M. Then, every sets in σ(B) is µ∗-measurable. Carathe´odory
extension is in particular used to define the product measures µn on Mn. The domain of µn is the the smallest
σ-algebra Bn generated by the rectangles A1 × . . . × An where each Ai is measurable.
Diagonal sets are usually non measurable in the product measure. Since these sets are important in logic,
one tries to add them as measurable sets. Let B(n) be the σ-algebra generated by Bn and the diagonal subsets
of Mn.
Proposition 2.3. (see [12]) Let (M,B, µ) be a measure space of finite measure such that every singleton is
measurable. Then, there is a unique measure µ(n) on the σ-algebra B(n) of subsets of Mn generated by the
n-fold rectangles and the diagonals Dn
i j
which extends µn and such that for any i , j, µ(n)(Dn
i j
) =
∑
x∈M µ({x})
2.
Moreover, for any X ∈ B(n), there is a µn-measurable set U such that µ(n)(X∆U) = 0.
Now we get into the logic and briefly review the framework of ”integration logic”, investigated in [1],
[11] and [12] for studying measure and probability structures by logical means. We use the terminology of
[1]. Using this framework enables us to formalize and express certain measure theoretic properties of spaces,
functions on them, etc, in a unified way. We first quickly review essential concepts and then formally define
some notions. By a simple (measure) relational structure (or simply, a structure) in this paper, intuitively we
mean a measure space we wish to study equipped with a family of relations, where by a relation we mean
a real-valued measurable function on (some power of) the measure space. Also there might be a family of
elements of the ambient set of the measure space which are needed to be considered as distinguished elements.
We usually assign a symbol corresponding to each of those relations and distinguished elements and call them
relation symbols and constant symbols respectively. We also call the set of such symbols a (relational) language
and usually denote it byL. Furthermore, we call the structure to which the symbols ofL is referring, and more
generally, any other structure in which the symbols in L are interpreted, a L-structure (as formally will be
defined in Definition 2.4). In fact, in order to systematically study one or a family of structures by logical
means, we usually first choose a suitable language L consisting of the symbols corresponding to all relations
and distinguished elements we intend to deal with or investigate in our structure(s). So now those structure(s)
can be seen as L-structure(s). Then, we can use symbols in L as well as variable symbols (as are defined
below) and logical symbols (namely, connectives and quantifiers as explained below) to write formal logical
expressions called formulas, statements and sentences, describing our L-structure(s) logically. This enables us
to study mathematical properties of the structure(s) in hand through formal logical tools and syntactic methods.
Note that in most of the structures in this paper, real functions on the spaces play the main role. In particular, in
the case of Daniell-Stone and Riesz representation theorems, one has to deal mainly with just certain spaces of
real-valued functions on ambient sets and some functions (more precisely, functionals) on those spaces. Due to
this reason, it would be sufficient for us to only work with relational structures and even more, let our languages
contain, beside possibly some constant symbols, solely unary-relational symbols (i.e. real-valued functions on
the ambient space itself and not a power of it), with the intention to be interpreted as the functions belonging to
those spaces. Because of this, in reviewing the setup of integration logic in this paper, we restricted ourselves
to only relational structures and languages. However, it worth to mention that in general, in integration logic
(and more generally in mathematical logic), languages can contain, in addition, another type of symbol namely
function symbols with the intended interpretation as functions from the structure (or some power of it) to itself.
We always assume that a languageL contains a distinguished binary relation symbol e for equality. We also
assume that to each relation symbol R is assigned a nonnegative real number ♭R called its universal bound. In
particular, ♭e = 1. As will be explained more in Definition 2.5, logical symbols consist of the binary functions
+, ·, the unary absolute value function | | and a 0-ary function r for each real number r. These functions are
considered as connectives. The integration symbol
∫
is also a logical symbol and used as a quantifier. We
also use an infinite list x, y, ... of individual variable symbols. We call the family of all variable symbols and
constant symbols, the collection of L-terms.
Definition 2.4. Let L be a relational language. A simple (relational) L-structure (or simply, a L-structure) is
a non-empty measure space (M,B, µ), in which every singleton is measurable and µ(M) = 1, equipped with:
- for each n, the measure µ(n) given by Proposition 2.3
- for each constant symbol c ∈ L (if there is any), an element cM ∈ M
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- for each n-ary relation symbol R ∈ L (if there is any), a measurable function RM : Mn → R such that
|RM(a¯)| 6 ♭R for any a¯ ∈ M.
We refer to RM and cM as the interpretations (in M) of the relation and constant symbols R and c.
Note that in every structure, the binary equality relation e(x, y) is interpreted as a two variable function
taking value 1 if x = y and 0 otherwise. For a language L, the family of L-formulas is inductively defined as
follows.
Definition 2.5. 1. If R is a n-ary relation symbol inL and t1, ..., tn areL-terms, then R(t1, ..., tn) is a formula.
In particular, e(x, y) is a formula.
2. For any r ∈ R, r is a formula.
3. If φ and ψ are formulas then |φ|, φ + ψ and φ · ψ are formulas.
4. If φ(x¯, y) is a formula, then
∫
φ(x¯, y)dy is a formula.
It is important to note that the expressions φ ∨ ψ and φ ∧ ψ (the max and min of two formulas φ and ψ) are
also formulas since they can be built using +, − and | |. In fact we have φ∨ ψ =
φ+ψ+|φ−ψ|
2
and φ ∧ψ =
φ+ψ−|φ−ψ|
2
.
Free variables of formulas are easily defined (by induction) as the variables which are not bounded by the
quantifies
∫
. For example in the formula
∫
(x + y) dy + |2z|, the variables x and z are free while y is bounded by
the quantifier
∫
. One writes φ(x1, ..., xn) to indicate that all free variables of the formula φ appear in x1, ..., xn.
A closed formula is a formula without free variables. If φ(x¯) is a formula and a¯ ∈ M|x¯|, the value of φ(a¯) in M,
denoted by φM(a¯), is defined inductively in the natural way. For example
(φ + ψ)M(a¯) = φM(a¯) + ψM(a¯),
( ∫
φ(x¯, y)dy
)M
(a¯) =
∫
M
φM(a¯, y)dy.
So φ(x¯) gives rise to a real-valued function on M|x|, which is called the interpretation of the formula φ and
is denoted by φM. Note that, in particular, if φ is a closed formula, then for any model M, φM is uniquely
determined and is a real number. For example if φ =
∫
ψ(y)dy where ψ(y) is a formula, then φM =
∫
M
ψM(y)dy.
A statement is an expression of the form φ(x) > r or φ(x) = r for some formula φ(x) and some r ∈ R. If φ is
a closed formula, then the statement is called a closed statement (or sentence). Any set of closed statements is
called a theory. Obviously expressions such as φ(x) 6 r, φ(x) > ψ(x) + r or φ(x) = ψ(x) + r, where φ(x) and
ψ(x) are formulas, are also statements since they can be written in the form −φ(x) > −r, φ(x) − ψ(x) > r or
φ(x) − ψ(x) = r while −φ(x) and φ(x) − ψ(x) are again formulas. A closed statement φ = r or φ > r is satisfied
in a simple L-structure M, denoted by M  ”φ = r” and M  ”φ > r”, if φM = r and φM > r respectively. A
simple L-structure M is a model of a theory T , denoted M  T , if each of its statements is satisfied in M. A
theory is satisfiable if it has a model. A theory is finitely satisfiable if every finite subset of it has a model. The
theory of a structure M is the collection of statements satisfied in it. Such theories are called complete.
As some examples of basic measure theoretic properties expressible in integration logic, one can mention
that the expression ”singletons have measure zero” is stated by
∫
e(x, x) = 0. Also the expression ”the space
has total measure r” is written by
∫
1 dx = r. To see more examples the reader can see Remark 3.1.
Since now on, we work with The main logical tool used in this paper is the following theorem which is
basically Theorem 4.7 of [1].
Theorem 2.6. (Logical compactness theorem) Any finitely satisfiable theory is satisfiable.
Now we want to mention some technical points about the above theorem. However, this paragraph is
independent of the rest of the paper and the one who is not interested in logical details, can skip that. It worth
to be noted that in papers [1] and [12], in addition of the notion of simple L-structure, a more general notion of
structure, namely graded structures, was defined and compactness theorem was proved for such more general
structures too. Simple L-structures which are the concern of this paper are special instances of graded ones.
In fact, Theorem 2.6 is the compactness theorem restricted to the class of simple structures (with just unary
relations with exception of equality), as it is the concern of this paper. This is a very applicable variant of
compactness theorem with many applications in different situations.
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We recall a lemmawhich helps us to simplify the arguments. We say that a theory T is finitely approximately
satisfiable if every finite list of closed statements of the form φ = r and φ > r in T is approximately satisfiable
which means that for every ǫ > 0, there exists a model M which ǫ-approximately (with error at most ǫ) satisfies
that finite list of statements, or more precisely, |φM − r| 6 ǫ and φM > r − ǫ respectively for each of such
statements. Using a standard technique by a non-principal ultrafilter on N, one can easily show that:
Lemma 2.7. If T is finitely approximately satisfiable then it is finitely satisfiable.
Section 3 is where we use compactness theorem in order to prove the well-known classical measure exis-
tence theorems in measure theory we mentioned before.
2.2. Some preliminary lemmas
In this subsection, we state and prove a few statements which will be used in the proof of the main results
in the next section. We denote the characteristic function of a set U by χ(U). By a one-side (both-sides)
unbounded interval in R we mean an interval which is unbounded from one of right or left sides (both sides).
Through this subsection, we assume thatA ia a vector lattice of real-valued functions on a set X containing the
function 1X (the function with value 1 on every x ∈ X). Also we assume that I is a positive linear real-valued
function onA.
Lemma 2.8. Let f1, . . . , fm be a not necessarily distinct finite family of functions in A and U1, . . . ,Um a not
necessarily distinct family of open intervals inR, either bounded, one side unbounded or both sides unbounded.
Then, there is some increasing sequence of [0, 1]-valued functions in A tending pointwise to χ(
⋂m
i=1 f
−1
i
(Ui))
while the supports of functions in the sequence are subsets of
⋂m
i=1 f
−1
i
(Ui), and similarly, there is some in-
creasing sequence of [0, 1]-valued functions in A tending pointwise to χ(
⋃m
i=1 f
−1
i
(Ui)) while the support of
its functions are subsets of
⋃m
i=1 f
−1
i
(Ui). Moreover, the statement holds when we replace the words ”open
intervals” to ”closed intervals”, ”increasing” to ”decreasing” and ”subset” to ”superset”. In this case, in
particular, Ui’s can be single real numbers since every real number can be seen as a closed interval.
Proof We first start to prove the lemma for just one f and one U. Fix f ∈ A and α ∈ R. For every n ∈ N
set
g1n(x) := n
(
min( f (x), α +
1
n
) −min( f (x), α)
)
, g2n(x) := n
(
max( f (x), α) −max( f (x), α −
1
n
)
)
h1n(x) := n
(
min( f (x), α) −min( f (x), α −
1
n
)
)
, h2n(x) := n
(
max( f (x), α +
1
n
) −max( f (x), α)
)
.
Then, it is not very difficult to see that the sequences of functions (g1n)n<ω and (g
2
n)n<ω increase pointwise to
χ({x : α < f (x)}) and χ({x : f (x) < α}) respectively. Also support of each g1n and each g
2
n is a subset
of {x : α < f (x)} and {x : f (x) < α} respectively. Similarly, (h1n)n<ω and (h
2
n)n<ω decrease pointwise to
χ({x : α 6 f (x)}) and χ({x : f (x) 6 α}) respectively while support of each h1n and each h
2
n is a superset of
{x : α 6 f (x)} and {x : f (x) 6 α} respectively. Also g1n’s, g
2
n’s, h
1
n’s and h
2
n’s are functions inA taking values in
[0, 1]. So the statement is proved for one f and one U of the form (−∞, α), (α,∞), (−∞, α], and [α,∞).
For α < β, if (gn)n<ω and (hn)n<ω are sequences of functions obtained above increasing to χ({x : f (x) < β})
and χ({x : α < f (x)}) respectively, then (gn ∧ hn)n<ω increases to χ({x : α < f (x) < β}) and the support of
each gn ∧ hn is a subset of {x : α < f (x) < β}. Similarly, if (gn)n<ω and (hn)n<ω are sequences of functions
obtained above decreasing to χ({x : f (x) 6 β}) and χ({x : α 6 f (x)}) respectively, then (gn ∧ hn)n<ω decreases
to χ({x : α 6 f (x) 6 β}) and the support of each gn ∧ hn is a superset of {x : α 6 f (x) 6 β}. These prove the
statement of lemma for one f and one U of the form (α, β) and [α, β]. It worth mentioning that if (gn)n<ω is a
sequence which increases to χ({x : f (x) < β}), then (1 − gn)n<ω decreases to χ({x : β 6 f (x)}) and vice versa.
LetU1, . . . ,Um be open intervals of the above forms and f1, . . . , fm ∈ A. Assume that for each i = 1, . . . ,m,
the sequence (gin)n<ω is the sequence of functions increasing to χ({x : f (x) ∈ Ui}) obtained in the way that
explained above. Then the sequences of [0, 1]-valued functions (g1n ∧ . . . ∧ g
m
n )n<ω and (g
1
n ∨ . . . ∨ g
m
n )n<ω
increase to χ(
⋂m
i=1 f
−1
i
(Ui)) and χ(
⋃m
i=1 f
−1
i
(Ui)) respectively. Moreover, since the support of each g
i
n is a subset
of {x : f (x) ∈ Ui}, then the supports of (g
1
n ∧ . . .∧ g
m
n )n<ω and (g
1
n ∨ . . .∨ g
m
n )n<ω are subsets of
⋂m
i=1 f
−1
i
(Ui) and⋃m
i=1 f
−1
i
(Ui) respectively. Similarly, the same statements hold when we replace being open by being closed for
Ui’s, increase to decrease and subset by superset. In particular, in this case one sees that the proof works when
some of Ui’s are single real numbers since every real number can be seen as a closed interval. 
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Remark 2.9. Let f ∈ A and α ∈ R. Also let (hn)n<ω be the pointwise decreasing sequences of functions
obtained in the proof of Lemma 2.8 tending to χ( f −1({α})). Then, we call (hn)n<ω the ”decreasing sequence
corresponding to α for f ”. We remind from Lemma 2.8 that hn’s take values in [0, 1]. Therefore, since I is
positive linear, for every n, 0 6 I(hn) 6 I(1X). So, (I(hn))n<ω is a sequence of non-negative real numbers
and since (hn)n<ω is decreasing, again by positive linearity of I, the sequence (I(hn))n<ω is decreasing (but not
necessarily strictly decreasing). Hence, limn→∞ I(hn) exists and is a non-negative real number. We call α an
”inessential value of f with respect to I” if limn→∞ I(hn) = 0. It is not hard to see that for every n and every x
outside of f −1(α − 1
n
, α + 1
n
), we have hn(x) = 0. So, the support of each hn is a subset of f
−1(α − 1
n
, α + 1
n
).
Lemma 2.10. Let f1, . . . , ft ∈ A and (r, s) be an interval in R. Also assume that I(1X) , 0. Then, there exists
a α ∈ (r, s) which is an inessential value of every fi with respect to I.
Proof We prove the claim for t = 1 namely for one f . The general case is similar but needs some more
effort. Assume for contradiction that there is no such α for f . For each u ∈ (r, s), let (hun)n<ω be the decreasing
sequence corresponding to u for f (defined in Remark 2.9) and let S (u) := limn→∞ I(h
u
n). So, for every u ∈ (r, s),
since u is not an inessential value of f with respect to I, we have S (u) > 0 . Thus, for some m ∈ N, there exists
an infinite subset V of (r, s) such that S (u) > I(1X )
m
for each u ∈ V . Let v1, . . . , v2m ∈ V be distinct. So in
particular S (vi) >
I(1X )
m
for each i = 1, . . . , 2m. By using Remark 2.9, for each i = 1, . . . , 2m and n, support of
each h
vi
n is a subset of f
−1(vi −
1
n
, vi +
1
n
). Thus, for each i = 1, . . . , 2m, we can choose a function gi from the
sequence of functions (h
vi
n )n<ω in such a way that at the end of the selections, the supports of selected gi’s are
mutually disjoint. Since h
vi
n ’s take values in [0, 1] (by Remark 2.9), for every i we have 0 6 gi(x) 6 1 (for every
x). Now the function g :=
∑2m
i=1 gi belongs to A and 0 6 g(x) 6 1 for every x. We remind that I is positive
linear. Therefore, 0 6 I(g) 6 I(1X). On the other hand, for each i, since (h
vi
n )n<ω is a decreasing sequence, by
positive linearity of I, the sequence (I(h
vi
n ))n<ω is decreasing which follows that I(gi) > limn→∞ I(h
vi
n ) = S (vi).
So we have I(g) =
∑2m
i=1 I(gi) >
∑2m
i=1 S (vi) > 2m.
I(1X )
m
= 2I(1X). Combining above facts, we have I(1X) = 0
which is a contradiction. 
We say that a family of sets covers a set X (or is a covering of X) if their union contains X as a subset.
Lemma 2.11. Let (Y,B, µ) be a measure space of finite measure, K a R-vector lattice of real measurable
functions on Y and C the Boolean algebra generated by sets f −1(0,∞) where f ∈ K . Let X ⊆ Y and {Un}n<ω ⊆
C be a covering of X. Then, for each ǫ > 0, there is a covering {Vn}n<ω of X such that (i): for each n,
Vn = f
−1
n (0,∞) for some fn ∈ K , (ii): sum of the measures of members of this covering does not differ from the
sum of the measures of members of the first covering {Un}n<ω with more than ǫ, and (iii): µ( f
−1
n ({0})) = 0 for
each fn mentioned above.
Proof For convenience, we call a measurable subset D of Y a type I subset if there is some f ∈ K such
that D = f −1(0,∞). We call D a nice type I subset if there exists such f with the additional property that
µ( f −1({0})) = 0. Similarly, we call a measurable subset D a type II subset if there is some f ∈ K such
that D = f −1[0,∞). Since ( f −1(0,∞))c = (− f )−1[0,∞), by using disjunctive normal form representation of
members of Boolean algebras, every element of C, such as Un’s, can be represented as a finite union of finite
intersections of type I or type II sets. We call such representation of any Un a good representation of it.
Let ǫ > 0 be fixed. Also for each n, fix a good representation ofUn. For each n, letU
′
n be the modification of
Un by replacing the clauses of the form f
−1[0,∞) in the mentioned good representation of Un by some bigger
sets f −1(−δn,∞) for some small enough positive real numbers δn’s, in such a way that the difference between
the sum of the measures of U ′n’s, namely
∑
n<ω µ(U
′
n), and that of Un’s, namely
∑
n<ω µ(Un), is not more than
ǫ. It is easily seen that the family of U ′n’s is a covering of X. We note that for every f ∈ K and real number δ,
we have f −1(−δ,∞) = f ′−1(0,∞) where f ′ = f + δ. Since K is a vector lattice, obviously f ′ ∈ K . Similarly,
for every f1, f2 ∈ K , we have f
−1
1
(0,∞) ∩ f −1
2
(0,∞) = g−1(0,∞) and f −1
1
(0,∞) ∪ f −1
2
(0,∞) = h−1(0,∞) where
g = f1 ∧ f2 and h = f1 ∨ f2 respectively. Again, since K is a vector lattice, clearly g, h ∈ K . Now using
these facts, it is not hard to see that for each n, we have U ′n = f
−1
n (0,∞) for some fn ∈ K . So U
′
n’s are type I
subsets of Y. Let denote the family of U ′n’s by U. We remind that U is a covering of X. If all U
′
n’s are nice
type I subsets, then we are done. Otherwise, I , ∅ where I ⊆ N is the set of all n ∈ N such that U ′n is not nice
(so, for each n ∈ I, we have µ( f −1n ({0})) > 0). In that case, in the following procedure, we will replace some
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members ofU with some families of subsets of Y in such a way that after these replacements, our newU still
remains a covering of X, the sum of the measures does not differ with more than ǫ and moreover, our new U
only contains nice type I subsets of Y. The procedure is as follows.
Corresponding to each n ∈ I, we can find a sequence an
1
, an
2
, . . . of distinct positive real numbers decreasing
to 0 such that the followings hold.
(i) µ( f −1n ({a
n
j
})) = 0 for each j < ω.
(ii) µ(U ′′n ) does not differ from µ(U
′
n) with more than
ǫ
4n
, where U ′′n := f
−1
n (a
n
2
,∞),
(iii)
∑∞
j=1 µ(U
′′
n, j) 6
ǫ
4n
, where for every j < ω, U ′′
n, j := f
−1
n (a
n
j+2
, an
j
),
It is easy to see that for each n ∈ I, U ′′n = p
−1
n (0,∞) where pn := fn − a
n
2
. Also for j < ω, we have
U ′′
n, j = f
−1
n (a
n
j+2
, an
j
) = (hn, j)
−1(0,∞) where hn, j := ( fn − a
n
j+2
) ∧ (an
j
− fn) ∈ K . So U
′′
n, j’s and U
′′
n ’s are all type
I subsets of Y. Also (i) guarantees that they are all nice type I subsets. Now for each n ∈ I, we remove the
member U ′n from the family U and instead, add U
′′
n and all U
′′
n, j (for each j < ω) to U. Now, this newU is a
family of nice type I subsets of Y. Furthermore, for each n ∈ I, we have
(⋃
j<ω
U ′′n, j
)⋃
U ′′n =
(⋃
j<ω
f −1n (a
n
j+2, a
n
j)
)⋃
f −1n (a
n
2,∞) = f
−1
n (0,∞) = U
′
n.
So, having this, it is not hard to see thatU is still a countable covering of X. Also (ii) and (iii) guarantee that
for each n ∈ I, sum of the measures of U ′′n and all U
′′
n, j’s does not differ from µ(U
′
n) with more than
ǫ
2n
. So, sum
of measures of members of our newU does not differ from sum of measures of Un’s with more than ǫ. 
3. Logical compactness theorem and new proofs for some classical measure existence theorems
Existence theorems appear in many branches of mathematics. Logical compactness theorem (Theorem 2.6)
is itself an existence theorem and in fact a fundamental one. As we will see, it can be used in measure theory
in a systematic way to give relatively easy uniform proofs for many measure existence theorems. Meantime,
some interesting mathematical theories are axiomatized in the setting of integration logic. To start with, in the
following remark, we mention some basic measure theoretic properties expressible in this setting.
Remark 3.1. The expression ”the space has total measure 1” is stated by
∫
1 dx = 1. Also for any formulas
φ(x) and ψ(x) with the same free variables x (in a relevant language in the integration logic as defined before),
the expressions ”φ(x) = 0 almost everywhere” and ”φ(x) = ψ(x) almost everywhere” are stated by the closed
statements
∫
|φ(x)| dx = 0 and
∫
|φ(x) − ψ(x)| dx = 0 in integration logic, where we remind that the interpre-
tation of φ and ψ are measurable functions on our measure space. Let A = {r1, . . . , rn} be any finite subset of R.
Then, the similar expression ”range(φ) ∈ A (a.e)”, is expressible by the closed statement
∫
|(φ(x) − r1).(φ(x) − r2) . . . (φ(x) − rn)|dx = 0.
3.1. Stone’s representation theorem for probability algebras
The first applications of the logical compactness theorem we present in this paper is a new proof for the
Stone’s representation theorem for probability algebras. Recall that a Boolean algebra is σ-complete if every
countable non-empty subset a1, a2, . . . of it has a least upper bound ∨iai (or supi<ω ai) and a greatest lower
bound ∧iai (or infi<ω ai). A measure algebra (see for example [4] Definition 321A) is a σ-complete Boolean
algebra (B,∧,∨, ′, 0, 1) equipped with a map µ : B → [0,∞] such that (i) µ(a) = 0 if and only if a = 0,
and (ii) if a1, a2, . . . are pairwise disjoint (i.e. ai ∧ a j = 0 for every distinct i and j), then µ(∨iai) =
∑
i µ(ai).
Note that the notations ∧, ∨ and ′ in here stand for their corresponding operations in the Boolean algebra
B and shouldn’t be confused with the logical connectives defined before (with the same notations ∧ and ∨)
which stand for the ”max” and ”min” of two logical formulas. If µ(1) = 1, the measure algebra is called a
probability algebra. A σ-order-continuous isomorphism (or sequentially order-continuous isomorphism) (see
[4] Definition 313H) between measure algebras B1, B2 is a measure preserving Boolean isomorphism φ : B1 →
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B2 such that φ(∨iai) = ∨iφ(ai) for every increasing sequence a1, a2, ... in B1. We recall that in any Boolean
algebra, a partial order relation 6 is naturally defined by a 6 b if and only if a ∧ b = a.
To every probability space (M,A, µ¯) is associated a probability algebra as follows. Say X1, X2 ∈ A are
equivalent if their symmetric difference is null. The equivalence class of X is denoted by [X]. Then the set of
equivalence classes forms a Boolean algebra in the natural way and µ([X]) = µ¯(X) makes of it a probability
algebra.
A classical proof for Stone’s representation theorem for measure algebras could be found in for example
[4](321J). In the following, for simplicity, we prove the theorem for probability algebras. But it is easy to see
that a slight modification of the following proof gives rise to a proof for general finite measure algebras.
Theorem 3.2. (Stone’s representation theorem for probability algebras) Let (B, µ) be a probability algebra.
Then, there is a probability space (M,B, µ¯) whose associated probability algebra is σ-order-continuous iso-
morphic to (B, µ).
Proof Let L be a language (as defined in Subsection 2.1) consisting of a unary relation symbol Ra with
universal bound 1 for each a ∈ B. Let T be a L-theory consisting of the following expressions (axioms) which
can be carefully written as some closed statements in integration logic in the languageL (one can get help from
Remark 3.1 for stating them).
1. Ra(x)
a.e
= 0 or 1 (for each a ∈ B),
2.
∫
Ra(x)dx = µ(a) (for each a ∈ B),
3. Ra∨b(x)
a.e
= Ra(x) ∨ Rb(x) (for each a, b ∈ B),
4. Ra′(x)
a.e
= 1 − Ra(x) (for each a ∈ B).
Note that in axiom 3, the notation ∨ in the left side of the equality addresses the Boolean algebra operation
while in the right side refers to the logical connective ”max” between two formulas (as defined after Definition
2.5). We will show that T is finitely satisfiable. Let T0 be a finite subset of axioms of T . Let B0 be a finite sub
measure algebra of B containing every a ∈ B for which Ra appears in axioms in T0. Also let M = {a1, ..., ak} be
the atomic elements of B0, where a ∈ B0 is called an atom of B0 if given any b ∈ B0 such that b 6 a, either b = 0
or b = a. Then, it is not hard to see that µ induces a probability measure ν on finite space (M, P(M)). We prove
the satisfiability of T0 by making a model of it over the underlying finite measure spaceM = (M, P(M), ν). For
that, we need to interpret relation symbols Ra’s (a ∈ B) inM. For each a ∈ B0, interpret Ra with the function
RMa defined by R
M
a (ai) = 1 if ai 6 a and = 0 otherwise, for any ai ∈ M. Also for any a ∈ B \ B0, interpret Ra
with any arbitrary {0, 1}-valued function on M. Then, it is not very difficult to see that the resultingL-structure
is a model of T0. This shows that T is finitely satisfiable.
By logical compactness theorem (Theorem 2.6), T has a model, say (M,C, µ¯;RMa )a∈B, where each R
M
a is
the interpretation of the relation symbol Ra in this model. Note that by definition of a model, µ¯(M) = 1.
Also each RMa is a measurable function on M with respect to the σ-algebra C. Let B ⊆ C be the smallest
σ-algebra making every RMa measurable. Also restrict µ¯ to B and still denote the restricted measure by µ¯. We
claim that (M,B, µ¯) is the desired measure space whose associated probability algebra is σ-order-continuous
isomorphic to B. It is not hard to see that by axiom 1, each RMa is a characteristic function (up to a null set).
Let Xa := {x ∈ M : R
M
a (x) = 1} for every a ∈ B. Obviously, every Xa belongs to B. For every A ∈ B, let [A]
to be the equivalence class of A in D, where we define D to be the associated probability algebra to (M,B, µ¯).
Since each RMa is a characteristic function (up to a null set) of the subset Xa, it is easy to see that the measure
algebra D is the same as the measure algebra associated to the restriction of the measure space (M,B, µ¯) to the
sub σ-algebra generated by Xa’s.
Define φ : B→ D by φ(a) := [Xa]. We claim that φ is a measure algebra σ-order-continuous isomorphism.
We first check the injectivity of φ. Assume that φ(a) = φ(b) for some a, b ∈ B. So [Xa] = [Xb] which follows
that Xa
a.e
= Xb with respect to the measure µ¯. Then Xa△Xb is null. One can use the axioms to show that
Xa△Xb
a.e
= Xa△b where by a△b in B we mean the elements (a ∧ b
′) ∨ (a′ ∧ b). So µ¯(Xa△b) = 0. Hence, by axiom
9
2, we have µ(a△b) =
∫
RM
a△b
= µ¯(Xa△b) = 0. Now, by definition of a measure algebra, we have a△b = 0 which
follows that a = b. Therefore, φ is injective. It is also easy to see that φ(a′) = φ(a)′ for every a ∈ B.
Claim. Let (bi)i<ω be a sequence of elements of B. Then, φ(
∨
i<ω bi) =
∨
i<ω φ(bi) and φ(
∧
i<ω bi) =∧
i<ω φ(bi).
Proof of Claim. First assume that (bi)i<ω is an increasing sequence of elements of B and let b := supi<ω bi.
By using the axioms, it is easy to see that Xbi
a.e
⊆ Xb and Xbi
a.e
⊆ Xbi+1 for each i. So,
⋃
i<ω Xbi
a.e
⊆ Xb. On the other
hand, again by axioms, we have µ¯(Xb) =
∫
RM
b
= µ(b) and similarly, µ¯(Xbi) = µ(bi) for each i. Since (bi)i<ω
is an increasing sequence in the measure algebra B, by a known fact (see for example in [4]-321B), we have
µ(supi<ω(bi)) = limi→∞ µ(bi) = supi<ω µ(bi). So we have
µ¯(
⋃
i<ω
Xbi ) = sup
i<ω
µ¯(Xbi) = sup
i<ω
µ(bi) = µ(sup
i<ω
(bi)) = µ(b) = µ¯(Xb).
Combination of the above facts follows that Xb
a.e
=
⋃
i<ω Xbi . Thus, [Xb] = [
⋃
i<ω Xbi]. Moreover, we have
φ(
∨
i<ω
bi) = φ(b) = [Xb] = [
⋃
i<ω
Xbi] =
∨
i<ω
[Xbi] =
∨
i<ω
φ(bi). (1)
Now assume that (bi)i<ω is an arbitrary (not necessarily increasing) sequence of elements of B and let
b := supi<ω bi. Let ci :=
∨i
j=1 b j. Now (ci)i<ω is an increasing sequence and by (1), φ(
∨
i<ω ci) =
∨
i<ω[Xci]. So
φ(
∨
i<ω
bi) = φ(
∨
i<ω
ci) =
∨
i<ω
[Xci] =
∨
i<ω
[X∨i
j=1 b j
] =
∨
i<ω
(
i∨
j=1
[Xb j ]) =
∨
i<ω
[Xbi] =
∨
i<ω
φ(bi).
Moreover, by using this, we also have
φ(
∧
i<ω
bi) = φ((
∨
i<ω
b′i)
′) = (φ(
∨
i<ω
b′i))
′ = (
∨
i<ω
φ(b′i))
′ = (
∧
i<ω
(φ(b′i))
′) =
∧
i<ω
φ(bi).
It completes the proof of the claim. Claim 
Now we prove the surjectivity of φ. We remind from above that measure algebra D is the same as the
measure algebra associated to the measure space (M,B′, µ¯|B′), whereB
′ is the sub σ-algebra generated by Xa’s.
But by definition of a generatedσ-algebra,B′ is the closure of the family of basic sets Xa’s under the operations
”countable unions”, ”countable intersections” and ”complement”. So, it is not hard to verify that for showing
that φ is surjective, it would be enough to prove that for any sequence (bi)i<ω of elements of B,
∨
i<ω[Xbi] and∧
i<ω[Xbi ] are in the image of φ. But by the above claim, we have
∨
i<ω[Xbi] =
∨
i<ω φ(bi) = φ(
∨
i<ω bi) ∈ φ(B)
and
∧
i<ω[Xbi] =
∧
i<ω φ(bi) = φ(
∧
i<ω bi) ∈ φ(B). It follows that φ is surjective. Similarly, using the above claim
and arguments, it is not hard to see that φ is σ-order-continuous and measure-preserving Boolean isomorphism.
So, it is a measure algebra σ-order-continuous isomorphism. 
3.2. Daniell-Stone theorem for Daniell integrals
In this subsection, we give a new proof for the classical Daniell-Stone theorem. Like the proofs of the
other theorems in this paper, this proof is also using the logical compactness theorem as an essential tool. One
can find a classical proof for Daniell-Stone theorem for example in the book [18]. Let A be a vector lattice
(always over R in this paper) of real functions on a set X containing 1X (the function with value 1 on every
x ∈ X). A Daniell integral on A is a positive linear order-continuous real-valued function I on A where by
order-continuity is meant I( fn) ↓ 0 whenever fn ↓ 0X pointwise where 0X is the function with value 0 on every
x ∈ X. Since now on, when there is no danger of confusion, we use 1 and 0 instead of 1X and 0X . The Daniell-
Stone theorem roughly states that there exists a measure µ on X such that I is the integration with respect to µ.
By a lattice-linear combination in a vector lattice, we mean an expression obtained by combination of finitely
many elements of the vector lattice by some linear and lattice operations. For example, if x, y, z are elements of
a vector lattice, then x + (2y ∧ z) and (x ∨ y) ∧ (y − z) are some lattice-linear combinations.
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Theorem 3.3. (Daniell-Stone theorem) LetA be a vector lattice of real functions on X such that 1 ∈ A. Let E
be the σ-algebra generated by A (i.e. the smallest σ-algebra making every function in A measurable). Then,
for each Daniell integral I onA, there is a measure ρ on E such that I( f ) =
∫
f dρ for every f ∈ A.
Proof A standard argument shows that if I( f ) =
∫
f dµ holds for every bounded function f ∈ A, then it
holds for every function inA as well. Also if I(1) = 0, then it is not hard to see that I( f ) = 0 for every f ∈ A
which gives rise to a measure µ with µ(X) = 0. So, we may assume, without loss of generality, that A is a
vector lattice of bounded functions and that I(1) = 1.
Let L be a language (in integration logic) consisting of a constant symbol ca for each a ∈ X and a unary
relation symbol R f for every f ∈ A. Also we let universal bound of each relation symbol R f to be equal to an
arbitrary upper bound of the function | f |. In particular, for every r ∈ R, Rr is the relation symbol R f where f
is the constant function r. Let T be a L-theory consisting of the following expressions (axioms) which can be
written as some statements in integration logic in language L (one can get help from Remark 3.1 for stating
them).
1. e(ca, cb) = 0 (for every distinct a, b ∈ X),
2. R f (ca) = f (a) (for each a ∈ X and f ∈ A),
3. Rr(x)
a.e
= r (for each r ∈ R),
4. R f+g
a.e
= R f + Rg (for every f , g ∈ A),
5. Rr f
a.e
= rR f (for each f ∈ A and r ∈ R),
6. R f∨g
a.e
= R f ∨ Rg (for every f , g ∈ A),
7.
∫
R f = I( f ) (for each f ∈ A).
Note that in axioms 4, 5 and 6, the notations +, scalar multiplication r f and ∨ in the lefts sides of the
equalities refer to the corresponding operations in the vector lattice A while in the right sides address to the
logical connective ”+”, ”.” and ”max” between formulas as defined in Definition 2.5 and after it.
We first want to prove that T is finitely satisfiable. For that, we instead start to show that T is finitely
approximately satisfiable (as defined before Lemma 2.7), which by Lemma 2.7 amounts to saying that T is
finitely satisfiable. Let T0 be a finite subset of axioms of T and f1, f2, ..., ft be the list of functions in A for
which R fi’s appear in axiom 7 in T0. We show that T0 is approximately satisfiable. Without loss of generality,
we may assume that the function 1X is among f1, . . . , ft (otherwise, we can add the instance of axiom 7 for
the function 1X to the current list of our axioms in T0 and prove approximate satisfiability of this larger set of
axioms, which of course follows the approximate satisfiability of T0). So, without loss, we assume that f1 = 1X .
Fix 0 < ǫ < 1
2
. We will try to build a L-structure on the domain set X which ǫ-approximately (with error at
most ǫ) satisfies T0 (for example, if the axiom ”
∫
R f2 = I( f2)”, the instance of axiom 7 for f2, belongs to T0,
then we would have to show that
∫
R f2 6 I( f2)±ǫ holds in the structure). In order to build such aL-structure, it
would be enough to interpret every relation symbols R f and constant symbols ca in X and also define a measure
on X in such a way that the axioms of T0 hold with error at most ǫ. For that, interpret each relation symbol
R f ∈ L by the function f on X itself. Moreover, for each a ∈ X, interpret the constant symbol ca in X by the
element a itself. It is easy to see that the equality of any instance of the axioms 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6 appearing in
T0 holds (in exact way, which is even stronger than a.e) in this structure. For axiom 7, we need a probability
measure λ on X constructed in a way that the instances of axiom 7, where R fi’s in them are interpreted by fi’s,
are satisfied by error at most ǫ (or equivalently |
∫
fi dλ − I( fi)| 6 ǫ for each 1 6 i 6 t). Note that because of
linearity of integral and I, obviously every such λ on X which satisfies inequalities |
∫
fi dλ − I( fi)| 6 ǫ, also
satisfies inequalities |
∫
f ′
i
dλ − I( f ′
i
)| 6 ǫ and vice versa, where f ′
i
:= fi + c for each i and c is a big enough
positive real number such that each f ′
i
is a positive-valued function (recall that fi’s are bounded functions). So
we may assume from beginning that f1, . . . , ft are positive-valued functions. We construct the measure λ as
follows .
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Let J := [0, α) contains the range of every fi (1 6 i 6 t). Use Lemma 2.10 to find a partitioning
[u1, u2), [u2, u3), . . . , [us−1, us) of J, with u1 = 0 and us = α, such that each interval piece has length less
that ǫ and each u j is an inessential value of each fi with respect to I (as defined in Remark 2.9). Note that u1
and us are automatically inessential values of every fi since they are not in range of them. Denote each interval
[u j, u j+1) by J j. Also denote the open interval (u j, u j+1) by J
o
j
. Let B0 be the Boolean algebra on X generated
by the family of subsets f −1
i
(J j) of X. Also let P := {P1, ..., Pℓ} be the family of atoms of the Boolean algebra
B0. Clearly P is a partitioning for X. Also it is not hard to see that for each Pk we have Pk =
⋂t
i=1 f
−1
i
(J jk,i )
where jk,i ∈ {1, . . . , s − 1} for each i. For each such Pk, we define P
∗
k
:=
⋂t
i=1 f
−1
i
(Jo
jk,i
). Obviously, P∗
k
⊆ Pk for
each k. Lemma 2.8 gives us for each P∗
k
a particular sequence (ξkn)n<ω of [0, 1]-valued functions in A increas-
ing pointwise to χ(P∗
k
) in such a way that the support of each function ξkn is a subset of P
∗
k
. For each Pk, set
λ0(Pk) := limn→∞ I(ξ
k
n). Since Pk’s are the atoms of the Boolean algebra B0, λ0 extends in the natural way to a
measure (still denoted by λ0) on the σ-algebra generated by B0, which is the same as B0 since B0 is finite. We
normalize the measure λ0 and turn it to a probability measure λ on X. Note that as we will see later after Claim
1, we have 1 − ǫ 6 λ0(X) which follows that λ0(X) , 0. So normalization makes sense. Now it is easy to see
that, by using this measure λ, in fact we have obtained a L-structure on the domain (X,B0, λ).
Now it’s time to verify that axiom 7 holds ǫ-approximately in this obtained L-structure. We remind that
verifying this, completes the proof of ǫ-approximately satisfiability of T0. For that, we must show that for each
i = 1, . . . , t, |I( fi) −
∫
fi dλ| 6 ǫ. It is easy to see that by the way we have defined Pk’s in above, for each
Pk and every 1 6 i 6 t and every x, y ∈ Pk, we have | fi(x) − fi(y)| < ǫ (since fi(x) and fi(y) both belong to
J jk,i ). Therefore, for every i = 2, . . . , t, we can find some nonnegativeP-simple function hi on X (i.e. a function
which has constant values on each Pk but possibly different values on different Pk’s), not necessarily inA, such
that 0 6 fi(x) − hi(x) 6 ǫ for every x ∈ X. In the particular case i = 1, we define h1 to be specifically the
constant function 1X , which is clearly a P-simple function and also satisfies 0 6 f1 − 1X 6 ǫ for every x ∈ X
(since f1 = 1X as defined above). Let ri,k be the constant value of hi on Pk. Hence, for each 1 6 i 6 t we have
hi =
∑ℓ
k=1 ri,k.χ(Pk) where ri,k’s are non-negative. We have
|I( fi)−
∫
fi dλ| 6 |I( fi)−
∫
hi dλ|+|
∫
fi dλ−
∫
hi dλ| = |I( fi)−
∫
hi dλ|+|
∫
( fi−hi) dλ| 6 |I( fi)−
∫
hi dλ|+ǫ.
Therefore, in order to verify that axiom 7 holds ǫ-approximately, it is enough to show that for each i = 1, . . . , t,
|I( fi) −
∫
hi dλ| 6 ǫ (which, in turn follows that |I( fi) −
∫
fi dλ| 6 2ǫ and then, by a suitable arrangement of
ǫ in the beginning and replacing it by ǫ
2
, we get |I( fi) −
∫
fi dλ| 6 ǫ as desired). So, we start to show that
|I( fi) −
∫
hi dλ| 6 ǫ for each i.
We remind from above that for each hi we have hi =
∑ℓ
k=1 ri,k.χ(Pk). For each 1 6 i 6 t and n < ω define
hi,n :=
∑ℓ
k=1 ri,k.ξ
k
n. Since each (ξ
k
n)n<ω is (as defined above) an increasing sequence of [0, 1]-valued functions
in A converging to χ(P∗
k
) with supports inside P∗
k
(where P∗
k
⊆ Pk) and ri,k’s are non-negative, for every i,
the sequence (hi,n)n<ω is an increasing sequence of functions in A and for every point x in each P
∗
k
, we have
hi(x) = limn→∞ hi,n(x). Also for every x outside of all P
∗
k
’s, we have limn→∞ hi,n(x) = 0. Recall from above that
0 6 fi(x) − hi(x) 6 ǫ for every x ∈ X. Now it is not difficult to see that for each i, the sequence ( fi − hi,n)n<ω is
a decreasing sequence of nonnegative functions. For each i = 1, . . . , t, let Ri,n := ( fi − hi,n)∨ ǫ. So (Ri,n)n<ω is a
decreasing sequence of nonnegative functions too. Also for each k and x ∈ P∗
k
, the sequence Ri,n(x) decreases
to ǫ as n tends to infinity. It is easy to see that each Ri,n is a function inA.
Claim 1. Let i0 ∈ {1, . . . , t} be arbitrary. Then limn→∞ I(Ri0,n) = ǫ.
Proof of Claim 1. Fix an arbitrary small δ > 0. Let H =
⋃t
i=1
⋃s
j=1 f
−1
i
({u j}). Also let (ψ
i, j
n )n<ω be the
decreasing sequence corresponding to u j for fi (as defined in Remark 2.9) converging to χ( f
−1
i
({u j})). Thus,
each ψ
i, j
n is a [0, 1]-valued function in A. It is not hard to see that the sequence (vn)n<ω defined by vn :=
maxi, j ψ
i, j
n is a sequence of [0, 1]-valued functions decreasing to χ(H) pointwise. So, it is easy to see that for
every n < ω and x ∈ H, vn(x) = 1. Since every u j is an inessential value of each fi with respect to I (see
in above the way that u j’s were defined), then for every i, j, we have I(ψ
i, j
n ) ↓ 0 as n tends to infinity. So, it
is not difficult to verify that I(vn) ↓ 0 as n tends to infinity. Hence, by replacing the sequence (vn)n<ω with a
suitable subsequence of it, we may assume, without loss, that I(vn) 6
δ
4n
for each n. For every n < ω, define
the function gn ∈ A by gn := maxm6n m.vm. Then, it is easy to see that (gn)n<ω is an increasing sequence of
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nonnegative functions with gn(x) = n at each x ∈ H. It makes (gn)n<ω increasing to ∞ at each x ∈ H. Since
vm’s are [0, 1]-valued functions, gn 6
∑
m6n m.vm for each n. Therefore, for every n we have
I(gn) 6 I(
∑
m6n
m.vm) =
∑
m6n
I(m.vm) 6
∑
m6n
m.
δ
4m
6 δ.
Now we want to show that (Ri0,n − gn) ∨ ǫ ↓ ǫ as n tends to infinity at every x ∈ X. Note that for each n,
(Ri0,n − gn) ∨ ǫ is a function inA. Since (Ri0,n)n<ω is a decreasing sequence and (gn)n<ω increases to ∞ at each
x ∈ H, we have (Ri0,n − gn) ↓ −∞ on H as n tends to infinity. It is easily seen that for each k = 1, . . . , ℓ, we
have Pk \ P
∗
k
⊆ H. So (Ri0,n − gn) ∨ ǫ ↓ ǫ as n tends to infinity at every x ∈
⋃ℓ
k=1(Pk \ P
∗
k
). On the other hand,
we remind from above that for each k and x ∈ P∗
k
, the sequence Ri0,n(x) decreases to ǫ as n tends to infinity.
Therefore, since (gn)n<ω is an increasing sequence of nonnegative functions, (Ri0,n − gn) ∨ ǫ ↓ ǫ as n tends to
infinity at every x ∈
⋃ℓ
k=1 P
∗
k
. Combining the above facts, we have (Ri0,n − gn) ∨ ǫ ↓ ǫ as n tends to infinity
at every x ∈ (
⋃ℓ
k=1(Pk \ P
∗
k
))
⋃
(
⋃ℓ
k=1 P
∗
k
) = X. It follows, by order-continuity of I, that I((Ri0,n − gn) ∨ ǫ) ↓ ǫ.
Hence, there exists Nδ ∈ N such that for each n > Nδ, I((Ri0,n − gn) ∨ ǫ) 6 ǫ + δ. Thus, for each n > Nδ,
I(Ri0,n) − I(gn) = I(Ri0,n − gn) 6 I((Ri0,n − gn) ∨ ǫ) 6 ǫ + δ. So, since I(gn) 6 δ (as proved above), we have
I(Ri0,n) 6 ǫ + 2δ for every n > Nδ. Since δ was chosen arbitrarily, we have limn→∞ I(Ri0,n) = ǫ. Claim 1 
For each i = 1, . . . , t, since fi − hi,n is a nonnegative function (for each n), we have
|I( fi) −
∫
hi dλ0| = |I( fi) −
ℓ∑
k=1
ri,k.λ0(Pk)| = |I( fi) −
ℓ∑
k=1
ri,k. lim
n
I(ξkn)| = | lim
n
I( fi − hi,n)| 6 lim
n
I(Ri,n) = ǫ,
where we used Claim 1 in the last equality and also our definition of λ0(Pk) defined as limn→∞ I(ξ
k
n) in the
second equality. Specifying the above inequality for f1 and h1, we get |I( f1) −
∫
h1 dλ0| 6 ǫ where we remind
that we had assumed f1 = 1X and h1 = 1X . So, since I(1X) = 1 and
∫
h1 dλ0 =
∫
dλ0 = λ0(X), we have
|λ0(X) − 1| 6 ǫ. Thus, 1 − ǫ 6 λ0(X) 6 1 + ǫ. Since λ is the normalization of λ0, we have λ =
1
λ0(X)
λ0. So
1
1+ǫ
λ0 6 λ 6
1
1−ǫ
λ0. Now, using above inequalities, for each 1 6 i 6 t we have
∣∣∣I( fi) −
∫
hi dλ
∣∣∣ 6 ∣∣∣I( fi) −
∫
hi dλ0
∣∣∣ + ∣∣∣
∫
hi dλ0 −
∫
hi dλ
∣∣∣ 6 ǫ + ∣∣∣
∫
hi dλ0 −
1
λ0(X)
∫
hi dλ0
∣∣∣
= ǫ +
∣∣∣(1 − 1
λ0(X)
)
∣∣∣ ∣∣∣
∫
hi dλ0
∣∣∣ 6 ǫ + ∣∣∣(λ0(X) − 1
λ0(X)
)
∣∣∣ sup hi.λ0(X) = ǫ + ∣∣∣λ0(X) − 1∣∣∣ sup hi 6 ǫ + ǫ sup hi
6 ǫ(1 + sup fi).
So, by a suitable arrangement for ǫ from the beginning, one guarantees the axiom 7 to be also approximately
satisfied by error at most ǫ in the constructed L-structure. It follows that T0 is approximately satisfiable with
error at most ǫ. Consequently, since ǫ was arbitrary, T0 is approximately satisfiable. It follows that T is finitely-
approximately satisfiable and hence, by Lemma 2.7, finitely satisfiable. It finishes the step of proving the
finitely satisfiability of T .
Now, in the next step of the proof, by logical compactness theorem (Theorem 2.6), one concludes that T has
a model, sayN . Let (N,B1, ν1) be the underlying probability space of the modelN . DefineK0 := {R
N
f
: f ∈ A}
and let K to be the R-vector lattice of functions generated by K0 and constant functions (so, every constant
real function and every lattice-linear combination, for example (RN
f1
∨ RN
f2
) + RN
f3
, belongs to K). By definition
of a model, interpretation of every formula is a measurable function with respects to the σ-algebra B1. Note
that every function in K is the interpretation of some formula. So, every function in K is measurable. Let
B ⊆ B1 be the minimal σ-algebra on N making every function inK measurable. Also let ν be the restriction of
ν1 to B. We consider the measure space (N,B, ν). By axioms 1 and 2 of T and the fact that our model satisfies
them, it is not hard to see that we may assume, without loss, that X ⊆ N (by identifying every a ∈ X with
the interpretation of the constant symbol ca in N) and that each h ∈ A is the restriction of R
N
h
to X. It easily
follows that if we take any member of K , say θ := σ(RN
h1
, . . . ,RN
hm
) for some lattice-linear combination σ of
RN
h1
, . . . ,RN
hm
for some h1, . . . , hm ∈ A, then the restriction θ|X is exactly the function σ(h1, . . . , hm) which is a
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function in A. Moreover, by using the axioms, it is easy to see that RN
σ(h1,...,hm)
a.e
= θ. In other words, for every
θ ∈ K , we have RN
θ|X
a.e
= θ.
Let µ be the subspace measure on X induced by ν. We remind that the construction of subspace measures
was briefly reviewed in Subsection 2.1.
Claim 2. We have µ(X) = 1, which amounts to saying that X has full outer measure in N with respect to the
measure ν.
Proof of Claim 2. Let C be the Boolean algebra generated by the sets θ−1(r,∞) in N where θ ∈ K and
r ∈ R. Note that for every θ ∈ K and r ∈ R, we have θ−1(r,∞) = θ′−1(0,∞) where θ′ = θ − r, and since K
is a vector lattice, θ′ ∈ K . So C is the Boolean algebra generated by the sets θ−1(0,∞) in N where θ ∈ K .
By the minimality of B mentioned above, it is easily seen that B is the σ-algebra generated by C. So, since
ν is σ-finite, by a usual extension theorem in measure theory (see for example Theorem A p.54 of [9]), there
exists a unique extension of ν|C to B and it is ν itself. But, on the other hand, Carathe´odory extension theorem
(Theorem 2.2) extends ν|C to B. It follows that ν on B is the same as the measure obtained by the Carathe´odory
extension process from ν|C. Hence, by Carathe´odory extension process explained in the beginning of the paper,
for each U ∈ B we have
ν(U) = inf
{∑
i<ω
ν(Ui) : U ⊆
⋃
i<ω
Ui,Ui ∈ C
}
.
Now by definition of subspace measure and above facts, we have
µ(X) = inf
{
ν(U) : X ⊆ U ∈ B
}
= inf
{
inf
{∑
i<ω
ν(Ui) : U ⊆
⋃
i<ω
Ui,Ui ∈ C
}
: X ⊆ U ∈ B
}
= inf
{∑
i<ω
ν(Ui) : ∃U s.t X ⊆ U ∈ B, U ⊆
⋃
i<ω
Ui,Ui ∈ C
}
= inf
{∑
i<ω
ν(Ui) : X ⊆
⋃
i<ω
Ui,Ui ∈ C
}
.
Let {Ui}i<ω ⊆ C be a covering of X. To complete the proof of Claim 2, it is enough to show that 1 6∑
i<ω ν(Ui). As mentioned above,K is a R-vector lattice of real measurable functions on (N,B, ν) and C is the
Boolean algebra generated by the sets θ−1(0,∞) in N where θ ∈ K . So, by applying Lemma 2.11, for every
ǫ > 0, one can find a countable covering of X of subsets of N of the form θ−1(0,∞) with θ ∈ K with the
property ν(θ−1({0})) = 0 in such a way that sum of their ν-measures does not differ from sum of ν-measures of
Ui’s with more than ǫ. Thus, if we manage to prove that for each ǫ > 0, sum of the ν-measures of members
of such mentioned covering corresponding to ǫ obtained by Lemma 2.11 is at least 1, then we conclude that
1 6
∑
i<ω ν(Ui) as desired and we would be done. So, by abuse of notations, we may assume from the beginning
that {Ui}i<ω is such a covering and for each i, Ui = θ
−1
i
(0,∞) for some θi ∈ K and moreover, ν(θ
−1
i
({0})) = 0. So
now, we only need to show that in this particular covering of X with the mentioned properties, 1 6
∑
i<ω ν(Ui)
holds.
Define Vi := Ui ∩ X for each i. Then, clearly {Vi}i<ω is a covering for X. Also, for each i < ω, we have
Vi = f
−1
i
(0,∞) where fi := θi|X . We remind that we are viewing (by using axioms 1 and 2) X as a subset of N
and moreover, as mentioned above, restriction of any member of K to X belongs toA. So we have fi ∈ A for
each i < ω. Also, as we had mentioned earlier, we have RN
fi
a.e
= θi. By Lemma 2.8, for each i < ω, there is a
particular increasing sequence ( fi,n)n<ω of [0, 1]-valued functions in A converging to χ(Vi) pointwise and that
the support of each function in the sequence is a subset of Vi.
Subclaim. For each i, n < ω, we have
∫
RN
fi,n
dν 6 ν(Ui).
Proof of Subclaim. We first define some notions. We call a pair ( f , g) of real-valued functions on a domain
set a special pair if for all x in the domain, firstly, 0 6 f (x) 6 1, and secondly, if g(x) < 0 then f (x) = 0. If
the domain is a measure space, we call a pair ( f , g) almost special if the same conditions hold when we replace
”for all x” with ”for almost all x with respect to the measure on the domain”. Also for every two functions f
and g over a domain, we use the notation f ∗ g for denoting the function ( f ∨ (−g∨ 0))− f − (−g∨ 0). It is not
difficult to see that a pair ( f , g) of functions on a domain is a special pair if and only if f ∗ g = 0 and 0 6 f 6 1
at every point. Similarly, it is not hard to verify that a pair ( f , g) of functions on a measure space is an almost
special pair if and only if
∫
| f ∗ g| = 0,
∫
( f ∧ 0) = 0 and
∫
(( f ∨ 1) − 1) = 0. Note that by using the axioms of
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theory T , it is not hard to see that for every f , g ∈ A, we have R f ∗ Rg
a.e
= R f∗g. Also we remind that by axiom
3, for every constant function r, we have Rr
a.e
= r.
Now we start to show that for any i and n, we have
∫
RN
fi,n
dν 6 ν(Ui). Fix any arbitrary i and n. Since fi,n is
[0, 1]-valued and takes value 0 outside Vi and also Vi = f
−1
i
(0,∞) (see above), the pair ( fi,n, fi) is a special pair
(on the domain X). So, fi,n ∗ fi = 0 and 0 6 fi,n 6 1 at every point. We claim that (R
N
fi,n
,RN
fi
) is an almost special
pair on (N,B, ν). In order to show this, we verify the equivalent condition to being almost special mentioned in
the previous paragraph. By using the axioms and above facts, we have
∫
|RNfi,n ∗R
N
fi
| dν =
∫
|RNfi,n∗ fi | dν =
∫
((RNfi,n∗ fi ∨0)− (R
N
fi,n∗ fi
∧0)) dν =
∫
((RNfi,n∗ fi ∨R
N
0 ) dν−
∫
(RNfi,n∗ fi ∧R
N
0 )) dν
=
∫
RN(( fi,n∗ fi)∨0) dν −
∫
RN(( fi,n∗ fi)∧0) dν = I(( fi,n ∗ fi) ∨ 0) − I(( fi,n ∗ fi) ∧ 0) = I(0) − I(0) = 0.
Also we have
∫
(RN
fi,n
∧ 0) dν =
∫
(RN
fi,n
∧ RN
0
) =
∫
(RN
fi,n∧0
) = I( fi,n ∧ 0) = I(0) = 0. Similarly,
∫
((RNfi,n ∨ 1) − 1) dν =
∫
((RNfi,n ∨ R
N
1 ) − R
N
1 ) dν =
∫
RN( fi,n∨1)−1 dν = I(( fi,n ∨ 1) − 1) = I(1 − 1) = 0.
Therefore, (RN
fi,n
,RN
fi
) is an almost special pair on (N,B, ν). We remind from above that RN
fi
a.e
= θi. Thus, it is
easily seen that (RN
fi,n
, θi) is an almost special pair on (N,B, ν). Hence, for ν-almost all x ∈ N, if the function
θi has negative value on x, then the function R
N
fi,n
takes value 0 on that x. It follows that
∫
U′
i
RN
fi,n
dν = 0 where
U ′
i
:= θ−1
i
(−∞, 0). Furthermore, as mentioned before, we have ν(U ′′
i
) = 0 where U ′′
i
:= θ−1
i
({0}). We remind
that Ui = θ
−1
i
(0,∞). So, we have
∫
N
RNfi,n dν =
∫
Ui
RNfi,n dν +
∫
U′
i
RNfi,n dν +
∫
U′′
i
RNfi,n dν =
∫
Ui
RNfi,n dν 6 ν(Ui),
where in the last inequality, we used the fact that RN
fi,n
is [0, 1]-valued almost everywhere (as mentioned above).
It completes the proof of the subclaim. Subclaim
For every n < ω, define gn := f1,n ∨ . . . ∨ fn,n. Obviously, every gn belongs to A. Since Vi’s cover X and
for each i, the sequence ( fi,n)n<ω increases to χ(Vi), it is not hard to see that the sequence (gn)n<ω increases
pointwise to 1X . Thus, by order-continuity of I, limn→∞ I(gn) = 1. We remind that in the proof of the above
subclaim, it was proven that for each i and n, (RN
fi,n
,RN
fi
) is an almost special pair on (N,B, ν). So, in particular,
for each i and n, we have 0
a.e
6 RN
fi,n
a.e
6 1. Hence, by using axiom 6, we have RNgn
a.e
=
∨n
i=1 R
N
fi,n
a.e
6
∑n
i=1 R
N
fi,n
.
Therefore, by using axiom 7, we have
I(gn) =
∫
RNgn dν 6
n∑
i=1
∫
RNfi,n dν. (∗)
By combining (∗) and the fact that for each i and n we have
∫
RN
fi,n
dν 6 ν(Ui) (the above subclaim), we get
1 = lim
n→∞
I(gn) 6 lim
n→∞
(
n∑
i=1
∫
RNfi,n dν) 6 limn→∞
(
n∑
i=1
ν(Ui)) =
∑
i<ω
ν(Ui).
It completes the proof of Claim 2. Claim 2 
Now, since by Claim 2 the set X has full outer measure in N, we can use Proposition 2.1 to deduce that∫
X
f dµ =
∫
X
RN
f
|X dµ =
∫
N
RN
f
dν = I( f ) for each f ∈ A. Finally, we consider the obtained measure µ on X
and restrict it to the σ-algebra E, the smallest σ-algebra making every function inA measurable, and denote it
by ρ, while it is easy to see that on (X,E, ρ), we have
∫
X
f dρ = I( f ) for each f ∈ A. It completes the proof of
Daniell-Stone theorem. 
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3.3. Riesz representation theorem
In this subsection, we will give a new proof for Riesz Representation theorem. Note that there are several
proofs for Riesz representation theorem via different techniques (such as classical measure theoretic techniques,
nonstandard analysis approaches, etc) for example in papers [6], [7], [10], [17] and [20]. The proof of Riesz
representation theorem we present here is using logic and is similar in many parts to our proof of Daniell-Stone
theorem (Theorem 3.3) we presented above. However, in order for reader to have the proofs of these two
theorems independent of each other and also for the sake of completeness and clarity, we present the proof with
details although in several parts we refer to the technicalities of the proof of Theorem 3.3.
Recall that the Baire σ-algebra of a topological space X is the smallest σ-algebra for which every element
of C(X) (the space of continuous functions on X) is measurable. A Baire measure on a topological space is a
measure on its Baire σ-algebra. We also remind that the well-knownDini’s theorem states that if X is a compact
topological space, and ( fn)n∈N is a monotonically decreasing (increasing) sequence of continuous real-valued
functions on X converging pointwise to a continuous function f , then the convergence is uniform.
Theorem 3.4. (Riesz representation theorem) Let (X, τ) be a compact Hausdorff topological space and I a
positive linear functional on C(X). Then, there exists a Radon measure ρ on X such that I( f ) =
∫
f dρ for
every f ∈ C(X).
Proof If I(1) = 0, then it is not hard to see that I( f ) = 0 for every f ∈ C(X). This case gives rise to a
measure µ with µ(X) = 0. So, without loss of generality, we may assume that I(1) = 1. Let L be the language
consisting of a constant symbol ca for each a ∈ X and a unary relation symbol R f for each f ∈ C(X). Also we
let universal bound of each relation symbol R f to be equal to an arbitrary upper bound of the function | f |. Let T
be aL-theory consisting of the following expressions (axioms) which can be written as some closed statements
in integration logic in the languageL (the reader can get help from Remark 3.1 for stating them).
1. e(ca, cb) = 0 (for every distinct a, b ∈ X),
2. R f (ca) = f (a) (for each a ∈ X and f ∈ C(X)),
3. Rr(x)
a.e
= r (for each r ∈ R),
4. R f+g
a.e
= R f + Rg (for every f , g ∈ C(X)),
5. Rr f
a.e
= rR f (for each f ∈ C(X) and r ∈ R),
6. R f∨g
a.e
= R f ∨ Rg (for every f , g ∈ C(X)),
7.
∫
R f = I( f ) (for each f ∈ C(X)),
Note that, as similarly explained in the case of Daniell-Stone theorem (Theorem 3.3), in axioms 4, 5 and 6,
the notations +, scalar multiplication r f and ∨ in the lefts sides of the equalities are referring the corresponding
operations in C(X) while in the right sides are addressing the logical connective ”+”, ”.” and ”max” between
formulas.
The proof of the finitely satisfiability of theory T is very similar to the proof of finitely satisfiability in the
Daniell-Stone theorem case we presented before. The main difference is that in the absence of assumption of
order-continuity property for I, we use Dini’s theorem and that (by compactness of X) uniform convergence
replaces pointwise increasing/decreasing convergence, to conclude that in this case actually lim and I still
commute.
Now, in the next step of the proof, we use logical compactness theorem (Theorem 2.6) to find a model for T .
Let (N,B1, ν1) be the underlying measure space of that model. Also let K be the R-vector lattice of functions
generated by the family {RN
f
: f ∈ C(X)}. Note that every function in K is the interpretation of a formula and
is measurable with respect to the σ-algebra B1. Let B ⊆ B1 be the minimal σ-algebra on N making every
function in K measurable. Let ν := ν1|B and consider the measure space (N,B, ν). By axioms 1 and 2 of T
and by identifying every a ∈ X with the interpretation of the constant symbol ca in N, we may assume, without
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loss, that X ⊆ N and that each h ∈ C(X) is the restriction of RN
h
to X. Also it is easy to see that restriction of
any member of K to X belongs to C(X).
We aim to show that X has full outer measure in N with respect to the measure ν. Note that this is very
similar to the proof of Claim 2 of the proof of Theorem 3.3. But for the sake of completeness we give the
general idea and mention some slight differences.
Let C be the Boolean algebra generated by the sets θ−1(r,∞) in N where θ ∈ K and r ∈ R. Note that for
every θ ∈ K and r ∈ R, we have θ−1(r,∞) = θ′−1(0,∞) where θ′ = θ − r, and since K is a vector lattice,
θ′ ∈ K . So C is the Boolean algebra generated by the sets θ−1(0,∞) in N where θ ∈ K . By the minimality of
B mentioned above, it is easily seen that B is the σ-algebra generated by C. So, since ν is σ-finite, by a usual
extension theorem in measure theory, for example Theorem A p.54 of [9], there exists a unique extension of
ν|C to B and it is ν itself. But, on the other hand, Carathe´odory extension theorem (Theorem 2.2) extends ν|C to
B. It follows that ν on B is the same as the measure obtained by the Carathe´odory extension process from ν|C.
Hence, by Carathe´odory extension process explained in the beginning of the paper, for each U ∈ B we have
ν(U) = inf
{∑
i<ω
ν(Ui) : U ⊆
⋃
i<ω
Ui,Ui ∈ C
}
.
Let µ be the induced subspace measure on X by ν. As mentioned above, we want to show that µ(X) = 1
or equivalently, show that X has full subspace measure with respect to ν. Let {Ui}i<ω ⊆ C be a covering of
X. Similar to the argument of Daniell-Stone theorem, it is enough to show that 1 6
∑
i<ω ν(Ui) and again
by applying Lemma 2.11, we may assume that for each i, Ui = θ
−1
i
(0,∞) for some θi ∈ K and moreover,
ν(θ−1
i
({0})) = 0. Let Vi := Ui ∩ X for each i. Then, clearly {Vi}i<ω is a covering for X. We remind that X is
being viewed as a subset of N and moreover, as mentioned above, restriction of any member ofK to X belongs
to C(X). So, for each i < ω, we have Vi = f
−1
i
(0,∞) where fi := θi|X ∈ C(X) and moreover, similar to the
argument we used in the same part of the proof of Theorem 3.3, we have RN
fi
a.e
= θi. Also, the family {Vi}i<ω
forms an open covering of X. Thus, by topological compactness, there exists m < ω such that X = V1∪ . . .∪Vm.
By Lemma 2.8, for each i 6 m there is a particular increasing sequence ( fi,n)n<ω of [0, 1]-valued functions in
C(X) converging to χ(Vi) pointwise and that the support of each function in the sequence is a subset of Vi. Now,
by a very similar method to the proof of subclaim of the proof of Theorem 3.3, we can show that for each
i 6 m and n < ω,
∫
RN
fi,n
dν 6 ν(Ui). For every n < ω, let gn := f1,n ∨ . . . ∨ fm,n. Obviously, every gn belongs
to C(X). Since V1 ∪ . . . ∪ Vm covers X and for each i, the sequence ( fi,n)n<ω increases to χ(Vi), the sequence
(gn)n<ω increases pointwise to 1X . So, by using Dini’s theorem, (gn)n<ω increases uniformly to 1X . Now, it can
be easily shown that limn→∞ I(gn) = 1. Again, similar to the proof of Claim 2 of Theorem 3.3, for each i 6 m
and n < ω, we have 0
a.e
6 RN
fi,n
a.e
6 1. So by using axiom 6, we have RNgn
a.e
=
∨m
i=1 R
N
fi,n
a.e
6
∑m
i=1 R
N
fi,n
. Thus, by axiom
7 and the mentioned fact that for each i 6 m and n < ω,
∫
RN
fi,n
dν 6 ν(Ui), it is followed that for each n < ω,
I(gn) =
∫
RNgn dν 6
m∑
i=1
∫
RNfi,n dν 6
m∑
i=1
ν(Ui).
Since the above inequalities holds for every n < ω, we have 1 = limn→∞ I(gn) 6
∑m
i=1 ν(Ui) 6
∑
i<ω ν(Ui).
It follows that X has full subspace measure in N with respect to ν. Now by Proposition 2.1, for each f ∈ C(X)∫
X
f dµ =
∫
X
RNf |X dµ =
∫
N
RNf dν = I( f ).
By considering the construction of a subspace measure and its σ-algebra explained in Subsection 2.1, it is
not hard to see that the σ-algebra of the subspace measure µ is exactly the same as the Baire σ-algebra on X.
It follows that the subspace measure µ is a Baire measure on X. Marik’s extension theorem (see [14]) states
that in a countably paracompact normal topological space, every Baire measure admits a unique regular Borel
extension. Therefore, in particular, µ on X has a unique regular extension to a Radon measure ρ on X. Also for
each f ∈ C(X), we have
∫
X
f dρ =
∫
X
f dµ = I( f ). It completes the proof of Riesz representation theorem. 
Acknowledgement. The author is indebted to Institute for Research in Fundamental Sciences, IPM, for
support. This research was in part supported by a grant from IPM (No.98030116).
17
References
[1] S. Bagheri, M. Pourmahdian, The logic of integration, Arch. Math. Logic 48 (2009) 465–492.
[2] S. Fajardo, H. Keisler, Model theory of stochastic processes, Lecture Notes in Logic 14 ASL, 2002.
[3] I. Farah, B. Hart, D. Sherman, Model theory of operator algebras I: Stability, Bull. London Math. Soc. 45 (2013) 825–838.
[4] D. Fremlin, Measure theory, vol. 3, Torres Fremlin, 2002.
[5] D. Fremlin, Measure theory, vol. 2, Torres Fremlin, 2003.
[6] D. J. H. Garling, A ’short’ proof of the Riesz representation theorem, Proc. Cambridge Philos. Soc. 73 (1973) 459–460.
[7] D. J. H. Garling, Another ’short’ proof of the Riesz representation theorem, Math. Proc. Cambridge Philos. Soc. 99 (1986) 261–262.
[8] I. Goldbring, H. Towsner, An approximate logic for measures, Israel Journal of Mathematics. 199 (2) (2014) 867–913.
[9] P. Halmos, Measure theory, Princeton, Van Nostrand, 1974.
[10] D. G. Hartig, The Riesz representation revisited, Amer. Math. Monthly 90 (1983) 277–280.
[11] D. Hoover, Probability logic, Annals of Mathematical Logic 14 (1978) 287–313.
[12] H. Keisler, Probability quantifiers, in: Model Theoretic Logic, edited by J. Barwise and S. Feferman, Springer-Verlag, 1985, pp.
509–556.
[13] R. Kuyper, S. A. Terwijn, Model theory of measure spaces and probability logic, The Review of Symbolic Logic 6 (3) (2013)
367–393.
[14] J. Marik, The Baire and Borel measure, Czechoslovak Math. J. 7 (1957) 248–253.
[15] A. Mofidi, S. Bagheri, Quantified universes and ultraproduct, Math. Logic Quart 58 (2012) 63–74.
[16] M. Rasˇkovic´, R. Dordevic´, Probability quantifiers and operators, Vesta Company, Belgrade, 1996.
[17] D. Ross, Yet another short proof of the Riesz representation theorem, Math. Proc. Cambridge Philos. Soc 105 (1989) 261–262.
[18] H. Royden, Real Analysis, Macmillan Co., New York., 1988.
[19] S. A. Terwijn, Probabilistic logic and induction, Journal of Logic and Computation 15(4) (2005) 507–515.
[20] R. Zivaljevic, A Loeb measure approach to the Riesz representation theorem, Publ. Inst. Math. (Beograd) (N.S.) 32 (1982) 175–177.
18
